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Powell: Flags of Convenience

TAMING THE BEAST: HOW THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME
CREATES AND CONTAINS FLAGS OF
CONVENIENCE

ERIC POWELL*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Centuries-old maritime jurisprudence continues to guide the law of the
sea today. These baseline understandings are necessary to maintain
order of the largest international commons, the sea.1 The seas’ central
role in globalization, though, strains some of this established law. In
particular, the question of jurisdiction has become increasingly complex
as ships regularly ply every ocean and visit ports in dozens of countries.
Many of these ships are actually subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of
States with which they have no connection and which have limited
incentives to regulate. This paper explores how this jurisdictional non
sequitur arose, and when international law permits concurrent
jurisdiction. Specifically, this paper emphasizes when U.S. courts can
reach activities on the seas.
The seas are both the lynchpin of global trade and the site of global
disasters. Nearly 105,000 ships2 transport more than 90% of world
* Eric Powell served eight years in the Navy’s active and reserve Information Dominance
Corps. He wrote this paper in partial fulfillment of his J.D. It was awarded Harvard Law School’s
Addison-Brown Prize for writing on maritime and private international law. He is a graduate of
Harvard Law School and Harvard College.
1. 71% of the Earth is covered by water. Aquatic Commons, Distribution of the Earth’s
Water, http://aquaticcommons.org/650/1/Poster13E.pdf (last visited March 16, 2013).
2. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Review of Maritime Transport, at
36-37, UNCTAD/RMT/2011 (Nov. 22, 2011) [hereinafter RMT].
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trade,3 including oil, chemicals, consumer durables and non-durables,
food, and people.4 Consider, though, recent reminders that the seas are
more than globalization superhighways. The quest for new sources of oil
tragically resulted in the 2010 Deepwater Horizon spill, which released
five million barrels of crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico.5 Less than
eighteen months later, the grounding of the New Zealand-bound
container ship Rena dumped oil into the sea and onto the shores, harming
regional wildlife.6 In January 2012, a cruise liner dramatically sunk off
the coast of Italy, killing at least twenty-one passengers.7
Tragedies on the maritime commons present unique considerations.8 On
ships, there is a preliminary question of what authority can set and
enforce standards on these floating islands. Then, the question of what
authority should have jurisdiction arises. The list of potential candidates
is long: should it follow the ship owner’s nationality, the crew’s
nationality,9 the incident site, or any of a host of other factors? Further
complicating the analysis is the possibility that multiple authorities
should exercise jurisdiction.
For at least four reasons, States, for their part, are invested in regulating
seas, even those far from their coastline. First, tragedies can strike in any
country’s backyard. Second, even local mishaps such as pollution can
have consequences far from the site. Third, every State has an interest in
maintaining the utility of the sea. Fourth, States are interested in
regulating and protecting their nationals around the world. However, a
3. United Nations International Maritime Organization [IMO], International Shipping Facts
and Figures, 7 (2011), http://www.imo.org/KnowledgeCentre/ShipsAndShippingFactsAndFigures/
Statisticalresources/Documents/December%202011%20update%20to%20July%202011%20version
%20of%20International%20Shipping%20Facts%20and%20Figures.pdf.
4. RMT, supra note 2, at 36-37.
TIMES,
5. See
articles
listed
at
Gulf
of
Mexico
Oil
Spill,
N.Y.
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/o/oil_spills/gulf_of_mexico_2010/index
.html (last visited March 16, 2013).
6. Oil Spill Disaster New Zealand’s ‘Worst in Decades’, BBC (Oct. 11, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-15251319.
7. Italy Extends Probe on Cruise Ship Accident, REUTERS (Feb. 22, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/22/italy-ship-investigation-idUSR1E8CQ02620120222.
8. Consider, for example, the different risk preferences in the United States and China.
American factory safety standards are more stringent than China’s. As one observer noted after a
recent fatal Chinese factory fire, “[W]hat’s morally repugnant in one country is accepted business
practices in another . . . .” Charles Duhigg and David Barboza, In China, Human Costs are Built
Into an iPad, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/business/ieconomyapples-ipad-and-the-human-costs-for-workers-in-china.html?pagewanted=all.
9. Ships’ crews are representative of the global nature of the business: more than 1.5 million
seafarers of nearly every nationality operate ships. IMO, International Shipping Facts and Figures –
Information Resources on Trade, Safety, Security, Environment, at 9 (March 6, 2012),
http://www.imo.org/KnowledgeCentre/ShipsAndShippingFactsAndFigures/TheRoleandImportanceo
fInternationalShipping/Documents/International%20Shipping%20%20Facts%20and%20Figures.pdf.
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system in which States project unrestrained regulatory power far from
their coastlines would be untenable for at least two reasons.10 First, this
unrestrained regulatory power may result in commerce-crippling
conflicting jurisdiction. United States Supreme Court Justice Jackson
presciently emphasized this insight when he wrote:
[T]he virtue and utility of sea-borne commerce lies in its
frequent and important contacts with more than one country. If,
to serve some immediate interest, the courts of each were to
exploit every such contact to the limit of its power, it is not
difficult to see that a multiplicity of conflicting and overlapping
burdens would blight international carriage by sea.11
Second, extraterritorial regulation raises a national sovereignty concern.
As Chief Justice Marshall famously penned in the seminal United States
Supreme Court case on the matter, “[t]he jurisdiction of the nation within
its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute.”12 Therefore, a
sovereign rightfully claims that foreign powers lack jurisdiction within
its land borders. A sovereign would similarly object to foreigners
reaching for jurisdiction over its local seas or vessels over which it
accepted sovereignty.
The limits on regulating the maritime commons inherent in a
Westphalian system of nation-States has long been resolved by assigning
regulatory, criminal, and civil jurisdiction to a vessel’s State of
Registration.13 In other words, the laws of the nation that charter the
vessel – which corresponds to the flag the ship flies – govern most
aspects of the ship’s operations as well as personal conduct onboard.
This compromise is referred to as the “law of the flag.”
In order for the law of the flag to satisfy States’ collective maritime
interests, registering States must promulgate and enforce legal regimes
10. This is a long-standing conundrum of conflict of law. The United States considered its
implications for State-exercised personal jurisdiction in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877)
And so it is laid down by jurists, as an elementary principle, that the laws of one State
have no operation outside of its territory, except so far as is allowed by comity; and that
no tribunal established by it can extend its process beyond that territory so as to subject
either persons or property to its decisions.
11. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 581 (1953).
12. The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 136 (1812). This was the Supreme
Court’s first case concerning the United States Federal Courts' jurisdiction over a claim against a
friendly foreign military vessel visiting an American port. Interpreting customary international law,
the Court concluded that there was no jurisdiction.
13. BOLESLAW ADAM BOCZEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDY
158 n.5 (Harvard University Press, 1962) (identifying a number of authoritative sources for this
proposition and asserting that “[t]his has been confirmed by practically all writers.”).
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that protect sister States’ reasonable interests. That requirement leads to
two simple questions. First, what sorts of States are less likely to create
or enforce such a regime? Second, how can sister States legally protect
their interests when the registering State fails to do so?
One set of States that might neglect to create or enforce a maritime legal
regime are those willing to register, or to “flag” ships with which they
have minimal or no connection. Perhaps the ship’s owner, operator,
captain, and crew are from a different State. Or maybe the ship’s
operations are unconnected with the flag State: for example, the ship may
never dock there or carry cargo relevant to the flag State. In an extreme
case, the flagging State may be landlocked. In short, the flag is a “flag of
convenience” (FOC), and the flagging State’s incentives to maintain a
minimally acceptable legal regime is open to question.
Today, FOC vessels account for a disproportionate amount of shipping
vessels.14 With State-vessel ties as flimsy as a few sheets of paper, it is
conceivable that these States lack the interest and capacity to regulate all
vessels carrying their flag. That developing countries, with troubles
more pressing than maritime regulation, predominate the FOC registries15
exacerbates this concern. Consequently, the international community
faces the possibility that its growth relies on an industry that operates in a
regulatory vacuum despite its potential to harm any nation.
This paper aims to better understand the circumstances in which a flag
State’s exclusive jurisdiction can be challenged. The next three parts
explain the legal regime from which flags of convenience emerged: Part
II describes the freedom of navigation, Part III explains the historical law
of the flag, and Part IV reviews the vessel registration process and the
sovereign’s right to establish domestic flagging standards. Part V draws
on these fundamental principles to explain the emergence of FOCs. Part
VI explores the theoretical and experiential concerns FOCs raise. Part
VII examines the various jurisdictional bases of international law. In
Part VIII, these international law jurisdictional hooks are relied upon to
evaluate what the international community can and has done in response
to FOCs. Part IX concludes.
II.

BASIC LAW OF THE SEA: FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION

This section introduces the historical basis and present-day codification
of the freedom of navigation. The freedom of navigation is one of the
14.
15.

See FOC Countries, infra note 96, andaccompanying text.
See RMT, supra note 2, at 44.
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most fundamental and widely recognized maritime principles.16 Today,
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)17
provides freedom of the high seas, which includes the freedom to
navigate the high seas without interference, to both coastal and landlocked States.18 UNCLOS echoes the United Nation’s 1958 Convention
on the High Seas (1958 Convention).19
UNCLOS20 divides the sea into the zones illustrated in the image below:
principally the territorial sea extends twelve nautical miles21 from the
coast,22 the contiguous zone occupies the subsequent twelve nautical
miles,23and the exclusive economic zone reaches to 200 nautical miles24
after which lies the high seas.25 As explored in more detail below, the
coastal State enjoys increasing power to regulate ship passage and
activities closer to its shores.26 A coastal State’s ability to exercise
jurisdiction is at its nadir on the high seas, which is “open to all States”
200 miles from the coast.27

16. BOCZEK, supra note 13, at 2.
17. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter UNCLOS]. UNCLOS is recognized as the “international constitution of the oceans”
although the U.S. has not signed it. Keith S. Gibel, Defined by the Law of the Sea: “High Seas” in
the Marine Mammal Protection Act and the Endangered Species Act, 54 NAVAL L. REV. 54 (2007)
(quoting Canada’s Ocean Strategy, Our Oceans, Our Future, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 5 (2002),
http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/oceans/publications/cos-soc/pdf/cos-soc-eng.pdf).
18. Id. at Art. 87. UNCLOS also recognizes freedom of the high seas to include overflight,
submarine cable installation, artificial island construction, fishing and other rights.
19. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312 [hereinafter 1958
Convention].
20. The U.S. has incorporated many of the UNCLOS provisions into domestic law.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES Introductory Note to
Part V (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
21. A nautical mile is approximately 1.15 miles.
22. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Art. 3.
23. Id. at Art. 33.
24. Id. at Art. 57.
25. Id. at Art. 86.
26. See infra notes 273-280 and accompanying text.
27. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Art. 87.
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Jurists have recognized universal ownership and freedom of the high seas
for centuries. Valin, the author of an influential eighteenth century
commentary on maritime law, explained, “[f]or in short the ocean
belongs to no one, and the conclusion undoubtedly to be drawn from this
is that all nations are permitted to navigate it.”29 Azuni, an eighteenth
century Italian publicist, grounded this freedom on the seas’ economic
importance as “great highways traced by nature between the different
parts of the world,” when he wrote, “all have the same equal rights to
[the seas’] use as the air they breathe, and to the sun that warms them.”30
Their Swiss contemporary, Vattel, also concluded that no single State
can regulate the seas.31 He relied on the observation that one may “sail
and fish without the least prejudice to any person whatsoever.”32 Thus,
there is a solid backing for the proposition that the high seas are a
universal possession.
III. LAW OF THE FLAG
The observation that there is no single sovereign of the high seas (Part II)
led to the emergence of “[p]erhaps the most venerable and universal rule
of maritime law”33: the law of the flag. This part presents the judicial and
theoretical underpinnings of this regime. States regulate and exercise

28. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association Office of the General Counsel, Maritime
Zones and Boundaries, http://www.gc.noaa.gov/gcil_maritime.html (last visited March 18, 2013).
29. United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249, 281 (1893) (Brown, J., dissenting).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 272-73 (Gray, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 281 (Brown, J., dissenting).
33. Lauritzen, supra note 11, 585.
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jurisdiction over their registered vessels under the theory of the law of
the flag.
In 1927, the Permanent Court of International Justice (P.C.I.J.) affirmed
the law of the flag in the Lotus case.34 In Lotus, the P.C.I.J. considered
whether Turkey could exercise jurisdiction over the French officers of a
French ship that fatally collided with a Turkish ship on the high seas.
The Court declared, “apart from certain special cases which are defined
by international law—vessels on the high seas are subject to no authority
except that of the State whose flag they fly.”35 Although the P.C.I.J.
subsequently found that this was a special case that warranted concurrent
jurisdiction because the French officers affected a Turkish ship,36 the
P.C.I.J.’s reasoning demonstrates the importance of the law of the flag.
The theoretical premise for exclusive flag State jurisdiction arises from
the historic concept of vessels as literally part of the flag-country’s
territory.37 Based on this understanding, foreign jurisdiction would be a
clear infringement on State sovereignty. Although this territorial
conception has largely been dismissed,38 the result that another State may
not interfere persists, perhaps because of its simplicity.39 Today,
UNCLOS mandates that “[s]hips shall sail under the flag of one State
only and, save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in
international treaties or in this Convention, shall be subject to its
exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas.”40
In summary, the law of the flag is the internationally accepted starting
point of high seas jurisdiction. As the P.C.I.J. Lotus opinion and the
UNCLOS provisions acknowledge, there are exceptions to exclusive flag
State jurisdiction.41 Concurrent jurisdiction of FOC ships hinges on
those exceptions, which are based on geography, nationality, domestic
34. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.)1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
35. Id. at 25.
36. Id. at 23. This holding was later reversed by the 1958 Convention and UNCLOS, which
hold in favor of flag State jurisdiction even in international collisions. See 1958 Convention, supra
note 19, at Art. 11; UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Art. 97.
37. See, e.g., Rodgers, supra note 29, at 264 (“As we have before stated, a vessel is deemed
part of the territory of the country to which she belongs.”); see also S.S. Lotus, supra note 34, at 25
(“[W]hat occurs on board a vessel on the high seas must be regarded as if it occurred on the territory
of the State whose flag the ship flies.”).
38. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 402 (rejecting the territory basis of high seas
jurisdiction in favor of an independent basis).
39. See, e.g., Lauritzen, supra note 11, at 585 (“there must be some law on shipboard, that it
cannot change at every change of waters, and no experience shows a better rule than that of the State
that owns her.”).
40. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Art. 92 (emphasis added).
41. See William Tetley, The Law of the Flag, ‘Flag Shopping,’ and Choice of Law, 17 TUL.
MAR. L. J. 139, 158 (1993).
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protection, and universal prohibitions. Before exploring those alternate
bases of jurisdiction, the following sections elaborate on how the
flagging process gave rise to FOC States and their attendant concerns.
IV. VESSEL REGISTRATION PROCESS
This section examines vessel registration: the administrative process that
connects a ship with a State.42 It discusses vessel owners’ legal
obligation to register, States’ control of domestic registration
requirements, diversity in registration requirements, and international
recognition of foreign registrations.
The requirement that all ships on the high seas have a registration is
demonstrated by court cases denying legal rights to unregistered vessels.
In 1982, the Eleventh Circuit considered two such cases in companion.43
In the lead case, American authorities seized an unregistered vessel on
the high seas44 and arrested its foreign crew on drug possession charges.45
Unlike previous high-seas seizures, there was no evidence that the vessel
was destined for, or had any connection with, the United States.46
Nonetheless, the court held that international law permits jurisdiction
over Stateless vessels47: they have no right to freedom of navigation
because they are “international pariahs” that pose a threat to the order of
the seas.48
The Eleventh Circuit cited an influential 1948 English Privy Council
opinion, The“Asya.”49 In that case, a British destroyer seized the “Asya”
freighter on the high seas after designating it Stateless and discovering
that it held 733 passengers with plans to sneak illegally into Palestine.50
In upholding the seizure, the Council quoted Oppenheim’s turn of the
century international law treatise, “[i]n the interest of order on the open
sea, a vessel not sailing under the maritime flag of a State enjoys no
protection whatever, for the freedom of navigation on the open sea is
42. BOCZEK, supra note 13, at 92; ROBERT RIENOW, THE TEST OF THE NATIONALITY OF A
MERCHANT VESSEL 214 (Columbia University Press, 1937) (“About this proposition that vessels are
stamped with the nationalities of particular States the whole of the maritime code for the regulation
of the use of the high seas has been built.”).
43. United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. Fla. 1982). Keep in mind that
United States local and district court cases are not binding international law.
44. What makes a vessel Stateless is outside the scope of this paper. In Marino-Garcia, the
crewmembers asserted a false nationality. Id. at 1378 n.3.
45. Id. at 1378.
46. Id. at 1377 n.1.
47. Id. at 1383. Note, however, that there is a circuit split on the matter. See id. at 1385.
48. Id. at 1382.
49. Id. at 1382-83 (citing NaimMolvanv. Attorney-General for Palestine (The “Asya”) [1948]
1 A.C. 351 (P.C.)).
50. The "Asya", supra note 49. See also 25 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 421-23 (1948).
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freedom for such vessels only as sail under the flag of a State.”51 Today,
UNCLOS codifies a vessel’s obligation to flag in its mandate that,
“[s]hips shall sail under the flag of one State only.”52
States exclusively control their domestic procedures for complying with
this international requirement. International law grants registering States
nearly unfettered authority to dictate registration requirements,53 except
that the registration (i) cannot infringe another State’s rights, (ii) cannot
be granted if there is a reasonable suspicion that the vessel will be used
to violate international law, (iii) must be for a single nationality, and (iv)
must be in accordance with State treaties.54
In perhaps the seminal case on this issue, the Permanent Court of
Arbitration in the Hague considered Great Britain’s objection that
France’s practice of flagging vessels from the British Muscat
protectorate interfered with Muscat’s independence.55 The Court
disagreed: it found that only France could restrict French registration
rules.56 The United States has repeatedly guarded this sovereignty. In
fact, at the nation’s birth, one of Congress’s first acts was to outline the
United States’ vessel registration system.57 A century later, the
Commissioner of Navigation affirmed, “[the United States] judges of the
requirements and of the formalities to be observed to give its national
character to private trading-vessels.”58 Nearly a century later, the United
States Supreme Court perfunctorily re-avowed, “[e]ach State under
international law may determine for itself the conditions on which it will
grant its nationality to a merchant ship.”59 Today, States’ registration

51. Id. (quoting OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 546 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 6th ed. vol. 1
1944)).
52. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Art. 92.
53. BOCZEK, supra note 13, at 105-06; EmekaDuruigbo, Multinational Corporations and
Compliance with International Regulations Relating to the Petroleum Industry, 7 ANN. SURV. INT’L
& COMP. L. 101, 109-10(2001) (citing Julie Mertus, The Nationality of Ships and International
Responsibility: The Reflagging of the Kuwaiti Oil Tankers, 17 DENV. J. INT’L. L. & POL’Y 207
(1988)).
54. BOCZEK, supra note 13 at 105-06; Duruigbo, supra note 53, at 109-10 (citing Mertus,
supra note 53, at 207).
55. BOCZEK, supra note 13 at 100-01 (citing Muscat Dhows (Fr. v. Gr. Brit.), Hague Ct. Rep.
(Scott) 93 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1905)).
56. Id. at 101. The Court subsequently found that France had bound itself in a Franco-British
treaty that prohibited this particular flagging.
57. H. Edwin Anderson, III, The Nationality of Ships and Flags of Convenience: Economics,
Politics, and Alternatives, 21 TUL. MAR. L. J. 139, 145 (1996) (citing Act of Sept. 1, 1789, ch. 11, 1
Stat. 55 (1789) (referred to as The Registration Act of 1789)).
58. RIENOW, supra note 42, at 17 (citing Mr. Fish to Admiral Polo de Bernabe, April 18, 1874,
Virginius, 2 For. Rel. (1875-76) 1207-08).
59. Lauritzen, supra, note 11, at 584.
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autonomy is codified in UNCLOS: “Every State shall fix the conditions
for the grant of its nationality to ships.”60
This sovereignty has resulted in significant variety among the more than
150 States that register ships.61 Importantly, some States permit foreign
ship owners to register their vessels. Such an “open registry” contrasts
with other States’ “closed registries,” which require domestic
ownership.62 Registration requirements differ along other axes as well.
For example, some States also require a portion of a vessel’s officer and
crew to be nationals, and some even regulate a ship’s place of
construction.63
States are obliged to respect other States’ registration methods.64 For
example, in The Virginius Incident in 1873, Spain argued that it
permissibly seized a U.S. vessel on the high seas because, in
contravention of American registry law, Cubans owned the vessel.65
President Grant, his Secretary of State, and his Attorney General all
responded that Spain must recognize the valid registry papers.66 They
asserted that the United States had exclusive jurisdiction to inquire
whether the papers were fraudulently obtained.67 Spain eventually
returned the ship, because it recognized the validity of the ship’s
registration papers.68 The Supreme Court later adopted President Grant’s
position that “a registration can be questioned only by the registering
State.”69
V.

FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE

As described in the previous section, the international system grants
States great flexibility to set registration terms that other States must
recognize; this dynamic created the context for widespread use of Flags
of Convenience (FOCs). This section defines FOCs, explores the
motives of FOC nations and FOC vessel owners, presents an example of
an FOC regime, and estimates the size of the FOC market.

60. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Art. 91. Again, UNCLOS is only binding on signatory States.
61. RMT, supra note 2, at 48.
62. Anderson, supra note 57, at 151.
63. See id. at 155-56 for descriptions of US, British, Liberian, Panamanian, and Luxembourg
registry requirements.
64. BOCZEK, supra note 13, at 112.
65. See BOCZEK, supra note 13, at 112.
66. BOCZEK, supra note 13, at 112-13.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 112. It was too late, though, to save most of the crew and passengers from Spanish
execution.
69. Lauritzen, supra note 11, at 584.
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FOC is a slippery and generally pejorative term that describes a registry
with certain characteristics and membership motivations.70 In a widely
referenced 1970 British investigation of flags of convenience, the
Rochdale Report by the British Committee of Inquiry identified six
characteristics FOC registries often exhibit.71 First, FOCs are open
registries: foreigners can own the vessel.72 Second, the registry is easily
accessible, often from a consulate abroad.73 Third, the registry imposes
minimal or no income taxes; revenues are predominately from registry
and annual fees.74 Fourth, apart from the revenues, the level of
registration exceeds the flag State’s requirements for domestic shipping,
such as defense.75 The associated revenues may substantially impact the
country’s finances.76 Fifth, there are no domestic crewing requirements.77
And sixth, the flag State lacks the power and administration to
effectively impose regulations.78
In contrast to traditional maritime nations, whose registries are
predominately motivated by the merchant marine’s role in national
defense,79 FOC countries have predominately pecuniary motivations.80
Financial motivations are not confined to direct revenues from registries:
some countries use FOCs as a loss-leader to attract companies to
offshore industries.81 Some scholars argue that FOC countries
additionally seek international influence,82 though this is at most an
ancillary motivation, especially at first.83

70. Anderson, supra note 57, at 157.
71. Quoted in Anderson, supra note 57, at 157.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 158.
79. RIENOW, supra note 42, at 5. The merchant marine is critical to military sealift. See infra
notes 137-39 and accompanying text. In addition, States can convert registered ships into warships
or appropriate it for other purposes. RIENOW, supra note 42, at 5, 7; see alsoinfra notes 133-135 and
accompanying text.
80. Duruigbo, supra note 53, at 113 (citing Richard Payne, Flags of Convenience and Oil
Pollution: A Threat to National Security, 3 HOUSTON J. INT’L L. 67, 69 (1980)).
81. ELIZABETH R. DESOMBRE, FLAGGING STANDARDS: GLOBALIZATION AND
ENVIRONMENTAL, SAFETY, AND LABOR REGULATIONS AT SEA 213 (The MIT Press, 2006).
82. DESOMBRE, supra note 81, at 210; Anderson, supra note 57, at 160 n.137.
83. For this proposition, Anderson references Panama and Liberia’s leadership roles in the
International Maritime Organization. Supra note 57, at 160 n.137. It should be recognized that the
influence cited, then, is largely confined to the maritime sector itself. Further, it did not arise
organically but was begrudgingly accepted by the traditional maritime nations following a court
order. See also RODNEY CARLISLE, SOVEREIGNTY FOR SALE: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE
PANAMANIAN AND LIBERIAN FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE 156-57 (Naval Institute Press, 1st ed. 1981).
The court premised its mandate on the size of the Panamanian and Liberian registries, not simply
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For example, consider the Liberian registry in 1996.84 Administered
through a Virginia-based company, it was nearly completely open.85
Liberia imposed no crew nationality requirements and granted tax
subsidies to registered ships.86 Liberia almost certainly considered the
registry a success: it generated 50-75% of the country’s annual
revenues.87
For their part, ship owners seek a comparative advantage. In FOC
registries, they can often minimize operating costs by exploiting low tax
rates and labor costs.88 For example, Exxon estimated that it would cost
78% less to operate a 28-man tanker from the Philippines than one from
the United States.89 Low standards in areas such as pollution may also
incentivize registrations of convenience, though the evidence is mixed.90
In addition, the reduced likelihood of wartime conscription and the
potential ability to avoid legal ramifications may influence ship owners’
registration decisions.91
FOCs, with roots stretching at least to Roman times,92 have increased in
importance in the last half-century. After an ignominious role in the
slave trade,93 their modern usage accelerated as post-World War I havens
from U.S. efforts to build a strong merchant marine and impose domestic
social reforms-like-prohibitions.94 United States-based shipping
their existence, which clearly Panama and Liberia could not have anticipated when they began their
registries.
84. It is unclear if Liberia’s registration requirements have changed since 1996. Regardless, its
dated procedures should be considered emblematic of the procedures in more emerging FOC
countries today: as Liberia has gained prominence as a flagging country, other countries have
assumed Liberia’s previous role as a minimum-requirement country. DESOMBRE, supra note 81, at
99. For current registry requirements of different vessels, see Liberian Registry, Vessel Registration
Procedures, www.liscr.com (under the “Maritime” tab choose “Vessel Registration Procedures”).
85. Anderson, supra note 57, at 155. I hedge “nearly” because there was a toothless maximum
size restriction for foreign-owned vessels that could be waived or circumvented by creating a paper
corporation or partnership in Liberia.
86. Id.
87. Vessel Operations Under Flags of Convenience and Their Implications on National
Security Before the Spec. Oversight Panel on the Merchant Marine of the H. Comm. on Armed
Services, 107th Cong. 14 (2002) (Statement of Frank A.Wolf, Rep. of Va.) [hereinafterVessel
Operations Under FOC].
88. Duruigbo, supra note 53, at 114.
89. Id. at 114 (citing L.F.E. Goldie, Environmental Catastrophes and Flags of Convenience –
Does the Present Law Pose Speical Liability Issues? 3 PACE Y.B. INT’L L. 63, 73 n. 471 (1991)).
90. Duruigbo, supra note 53, at 114-15; see also infra notes 119-123, 146-49 and
accompanying text.
91. Tina Shaughnessy & Ellen Tobin, Flags of Inconvenience: Freedom and Insecurity on the
High Seas, 5 J. INT’L L. &POL’Y 15 (2006-07).
92. Frank L. Wiswall, Jr., Flags of Convenience, in UNITED STATES SHIPPING POLICIES AND
THE WORLD MARKET 113 (William A. Lovett ed., 1996).
93. CARLISLE, supra note 83, at xiii.
94. Id. at 3.
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companies greatly increased their use of open registries after World War
II: ship owners were desperate to replace their war-ravaged merchant
fleet without the burdens of the American tax and labor regimes.95
Today, the International Transport Workers’ Federation, a seafarers’
trade union association, identifies thirty-two FOC countries.96 While this
list reflects the association’s political agenda, that FOC vessels sail the
high seas in large numbers is undeniable: countries accounting for 40%
of tonnage – Panama, Liberia, and the Marshall Islands – are not among
even the top thirty-five States of ownership.97
VI. POTENTIAL CONCERNS ARISING FROM FLAGS OF
CONVENIENCE
This part addresses theoretical and experiential concerns with FOCs.
Critics of the FOC regime include organized labor,98 environmentalists,99
security experts,100 and traditional maritime nations.101 Section VI.A
explains why critics allege that FOC States have low standards and
toothless enforcement schemes. Section VI.B amplifies the criticism that
FOCs harm national security by depriving the domestic State of maritime
surge capacity and by obfuscating ship ownership. Section VI.C presents
the objection that FOCs support human rights violators. Section VI.D
uses empirical data and incentive-based theories to offer an alternative
viewpoint that FOCs are not objectionable and may actually represent a
well-functioning market.
A.

STANDARDS AND ENFORCEMENT

Critics vocally assert that FOC countries have low standards for ship
work and life102 and fail to enforce even those.103 These shortcomings
affect work conditions, worker safety, the environment and other natural
95. Id. at 110.
96. FOC Countries, INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT WORKERS’ FEDERATION, http://www.
itfglobal.org/flags-convenience/flags-convenien-183.cfm (last visited March 18, 2013).
97. RMT, supra note 2, at 47. 40% of ships (by tonnage) are flagged in an FOC State but
owned by a person in a non-FOC State.
98. See e.g., International Transport Workers’ Federation, Flags of Convenience Campaign,
http://www.itfglobal.org/flags-convenience/index.cfm (“For 50 years the ITF, through its affiliated
seafarers' and dockers' unions, has been waging a vigorous campaign against shipowners who
abandon the flag of their own country in search of the cheapest possible crews and the lowest
possible training and safety standards for their ships.”).
99. See, e.g., Duruigbo, supra note 53, at 115-17.
100. See, e.g., Vessel Operations Under FOC, supra note 87, at 79 (Statement of Paul J. Pluta,
Rear Admiral, Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety and Environmental Protection, U.S. Coast
Guard, Dep’t of Transp.).
101. Anderson, supra note 57, at 167. See also infra notes 279-92 and accompanying text
regarding the “genuine link” campaign.
102. Shaughnessy & Tobin, supra note 91, at 18-19, 21.
103. Tetley, supra note 41, at 174.
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resources (such as fisheries), and safety on the seas. They result from
FOC States’ incentive structure, FOC States’ enforcement capabilities,
and FOC vessels’ shipboard dynamics.
From a theoretical perspective, critics claim that FOC States do not
internalize the costs of low regulation and that this disjoint in
expenditures widens the gulf between their and other States’
incentives.104 For example, landlocked States and States with little
maritime commerce are not as affected by sea pollution and maritime
accidents as coastal States.105 Consequently, they have little reason to
Likewise, a State has no
regulate risky maritime behavior.106
paternalistic incentive to protect its nationals when the ship owner,
officer corps, and crew are foreign.107 Absent the normal costs of a lax
regulatory State, nothing offsets FOC States’ preexisting pecuniary
incentives. Instead, avoiding the expenses of regulating – such as
operating a coast guard and administrative structure108 – and attracting
vessels and their associated revenues dominate FOC States’ decisions
regarding implementation and enforcement of regulations.109 A 1989
study seemingly confirmed critics’ nightmarish predictions: it found that
flag States acted on just 17% of foreign referrals for standard
violations.110
Critics additionally allege that ship owners can escape enforcement in
FOC States. First, ship owners in FOC States may be more difficult to
identify than in closed registries.111 Even once identified, owners’ ability
to hide behind new corporate identities hinders sustained tracking and
enforcement.112 Even if owners and other key personnel are identified
and tracked, they may be able to avoid personal jurisdiction by not
visiting the flag State.113 They may also refuse to testify, seemingly
without penalty.114

Duruigbo, supra note 53, at 108.
See Shaughnessy & Tobin, supra note 91, at 20.
Id.
Duruigbo, supra note 53, at 108.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing RONALD MITCHELL, INTENTIONAL OIL POLLUTION AT SEA: ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY AND TREATY COMPLIANCE 163 (The MIT Press, 1994)).
111. Anderson, supra note 57, at 164 (citing United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development [UNCTAD], Action on the Question of Open Registries, TD/B/C.4/220 (1981)).
112. Id.
113. Id. Cf.FED. R. CIV. P. 12.
114. Anderson, supra note 57, at 164 (citing UNCTAD, supra note 111). Notice that even a
damaged relationship with the flag State probably does not serve as a barrier since owners can
reflag.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
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Critics also claim that FOC vessels lack the shipboard dynamics to selfregulate. -On issues ranging from safety to living standards to
environmental stewardship, ship owners can pressure shipboard officers;
they, in turn, can manhandle the crew.115 Since officers and crew work,
facing the reality that they can be replaced at the next port, neither can
effectively request flag country help116 or union protection.117
Critics point to anecdotal incidents as evidence of FOC States’ unsafe
records. For example, the Deepwater Horizon rig and the Rena container
ship referred to in this paper’s introduction118 were registered in
traditional FOC countries, the Marshall Islands119 and Liberia,120
respectively. Investigations generally attribute accidents such as these to
a lax regulatory scheme and untrained crews.121
For example, the 1978 Amoco Cadiz oil spill dramatically illustrates the
origins of an FOC vessel and the factors that can lead to a maritime
disaster. Eight years prior, Amoco incorporated in Indiana and
contracted with a Spain-based shipbuilder to construct a supertanker.122
Representatives from Amoco and the American Bureau of Shipping
(ABS)123 classification society were on-site in Spain during the ship’s
four-year construction.124 A wholly-owned Amoco subsidiary
incorporated in Liberia accepted delivery of the Amoco Cadiz and
presently sold it to another Liberian Amoco subsidiary, this one with
Bermuda as its principal place of business.125
In the ensuing years, ABS periodically inspected and approved the
Amoco Cadiz.126 In 1978, on charter to Shell,127 the Amoco Cadiz loaded

115. Anderson, supra note 57, at 164.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See supra notes 5, 6.
119. Angel Gonzalez, New Gulf Spill Report Points to Missed Signs, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18,
2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903596904576514281511893242.html.
120. Press Release, Liberian Registry, Liberian Registry Cooperating Fully in Rena Salvage
(Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/BU1110/S00369/liberian-registry-co-operatingfully-in-rena-salvage.htm.
121. Anderson, supra note 57, at 162.
122. In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279, 1285-86 (7th Cir. Ill. 1992).
123. The American Bureau of Shipping is a classification society that, among other activities,
ensures vessels’ designs comply with their standards. Id. at 1286. See also Am. Bureau of Shipping,
What We Do, www.eagle.org (follow the “About ABS” tab to “What We Do”). It is one of thirteen
members of the prestigious International Association of Classification Societies. Int’l Ass’n of
Classification Soc’ys, IACS Explained, http://www.iacs.org.uk/Explained/members.aspx. See also
DESOMBRE,supra note 81, at 183.
124. Amoco Cadiz, supra note 122, at 1286.
125. Id. at 1287.
126. Id.
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crude oil in the Arabian Gulf, destined for the Netherlands.128 Its Italian
crew was experienced, its officers licensed, and all had participated in
land and sea exercises.129 The Amoco Cadiz’s steering gear failed nine
miles off of the French coast: the aircraft carrier-sized supertanker was,
in maritime parlance, “not under command.”130 A German salvage
tugboat responded, though her operations were delayed while the Amoco
Cadiz captain called Chicago for permission to contract with the tug.131
The tug’s efforts were ultimately futile: the Amoco Cadiz crashed against
rocks, split in two, and dumped oil covering 144 square miles of ocean.132
The trial court determined that the proximate causes of the steering
failure were Amoco’s failure to maintain the gear, train the crew, provide
back-up steering, and notice that the steering construction deviated from
the design specifications.133 In reviewing the substandard State of the
steering gear and its maintenance, the circuit court rhetorically asked,
“Why did these deficiencies occur? The record is replete with references
to the fact that it was Amoco’s deliberate policy to defer drydocking and
repairs in order to minimize the loss of charter hire that would be
incurred by taking the ship out of service.”134 Amoco Cadiz illustrates the
main grievance against FOCs: their ships do not strictly follow requisite
safety regulations.
B.

NATIONAL SECURITY

FOC critics also lament that foreign registries deprive home States of
critical national defense flexibility135 and complicate homeland defense
activities. A flag State can conscript and requisition its registered vessels
in a time of crisis.136 Every vessel that moves abroad for flagging, then,
reduces this emergency capacity. In addition, the merchant marine is
critical to war efforts abroad.137 In 1985, the United States Joint Chiefs
127. Ship chartering is a common business model in which the charterer contracts for the use of
the vessel. Of import here, Amoco retained responsibility for the ship’s nautical and technical
operation. Cf. Amoco Cadiz, supra note 122.
128. Amoco Cadiz, supra note 122, at 1287.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1288.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1295 (citing In re Oil Spill by the AMOCO CADIZ Off the Coast of France on March
16, 1978, 1984 American Maritime Cases 2123, 2173-88, 2194 (N.D. Ill. 1984)).
134. Amoco Cadiz, supra note 122, at 1299.
135. See e.g.,Vessel Operations Under FOC, supra note 87, at 25 (Statement of Schubert,
Captain, U.S. Mar. Admin., Dep’t of Transp.).
136. RIENOW, supra note 42, at 5, 7.
137. Lovett, supra note 92, at 57 (discussing private sealift’s importance in the Allied WWII
victory); see also Anderson, supra note 57, 21 TUL. MAR. L. J. at 144 (discussing the same in the
Falkland’s War).
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of Staff estimated that in the event of an overseas conflict, 95% of
deploying forces and equipment would be transported by sea,138 and
surely merchant mariners would conduct a large portion of this sealift.
In the recent Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns, United States-flagged
commercial vessels carried 60% of military cargo.139 While foreignflagged ships can provide this capacity, critics are concerned about their
allegiance to the United States.
In addition, the anonymity of FOC ship owners hinders homeland
security. Corporate veneers and forged identifications obscure Coast
Guards’ abilities to monitor who is visiting ports.140 Further, critics argue
that FOC masters do not responsibly guard against dangerous cargo.141
Therefore, FOC vessels could be used to stage a terrorist attack142 or to
traffic in illicit goods.143
C.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Critics additionally aver that FOC registrations are objectionable on
human rights grounds because their proceeds may support detestable
regimes. For example, vessel registry fees allegedly provided substantial
income for Charles Taylor’s regime in Liberia.144For thoroughness, this
paper acknowledges Human Rights as a consideration for critiquing FOC
registrations. However, further elaboration of this issue is outside the
scope of this paper.
D.

CONTRASTING VIEWPOINTS IN SUPPORT OF FOC REGISTRIES

On the other hand, some observers defend FOC registries. They point to
a functioning market that provides cheap transportation and data
suggesting that FOC States are not racing to the regulatory bottom. They
also note that international mechanisms ameliorate many of the critics’
concerns.
Defenders assert that the observed variety in registry schemes results
from the market catering to the diverse needs of different ship owners, as
138. Wallace C. Reed, U.S. Sealift and Nat’l Sec, in U.S. SHIPPING POLICIES AND THE WORLD
MARKET, supra note 92, at 261.
139. Status of U.S.-Flagged Vessels in U.S.-Foreign Trade Before the Transp. And
Infrastructure Comm, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of John Reinhart, Chairman and CEO Maersk
Line Limited), http://transportation.house.gov/hearings/hearingdetail.aspx?NewsID=921 [video].
140. Vessel Operations Under FOC, supra note 87, at 30-86 (statement of Pluta and Schubert).
141. Vessel Operations Under FOC, supra note 87, at 79 (statement of Pluta).
142. Id.
143. Vessel Operations Under FOC, supra note 87, at 103 (statement of Alex Vines, Senior
Researcher, Human Rights Watch).
144. Vessel Operations Under FOC, supra note 87, at 14 (statement of Wolf).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2013

17

147

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 19 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 12

280

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT’L & COMP. LAW [Vol. XIX

opposed to a race to the bottom.145 Based on this line of thought, the flag
State, then, may not actually drive standards; instead, internal corporate
culture and mechanisms are determinative. This market clearing
contributes to low transportation costs, which are passed on to
consumers.
There is also data that critics are off the mark. Open registries have, on
average, younger vessels.146 Since older ships tend to be in greater States
of disrepair, this is inconsistent with the belief that ship owners flock to
FOC States in pursuit of low safety standards. Similarly, an empirical
study found that vessels approved by respected classification societies
are more likely to fly an FOC flag.147 Anecdotally, the Amoco Cadiz148
hardly looks like FOC abuse when examined through a different lens:
although it was Liberian-flagged, Amoco hired a premier classification
society to oversee construction and conduct periodic checks, and it
employed licensed and trained seafarers. In fact, Liberia employs a large
team of inspectors and has a reputation for safety.149 In contrast, the
Exxon Valdez tanker responsible for the 1989 oil catastrophe near Alaska
– one of the largest oil spills in history – was United States-flagged.150
Lastly, defenders note that the international community can and has
taken steps to reduce the potentially harmful effects of FOC States.
These precautions include port and coastal State control, international
agreements, domestic shipping protections, financial penalties, and
registry requirements.
This next section discusses the various
international law bases of jurisdiction on which these mitigation
measures are based and then turns more specifically to exploring these
responses by the international community.
VII. BASES OF JURISDICTION OTHER THAN THE FLAG OF
CONVENIENCE
As discussed earlier, the law of the flag is of “cardinal importance” and
the internationally recognized starting point in maritime choice of
law.151There are, though, occasions for concurrent jurisdiction. This
145. See RMT, supra note 2, at 41 (“Different registries specialize in different vessel types”);
see also DESOMBRE, supra note 81, at 46.
146. RMT, supra note 2, at 40-41.
147. Jan Hoffman, Ricardo J. Sanchez, and Wayne K. Talley, Determinants of Vessel Flag, in
SHIPPING ECONOMICS 185 (Kevin Cullinane ed., 2005).
148. Amoco Cadiz, supra note 122.
149. DESOMBRE, supra note 81, at 98; see also Julie A. Perkins, Ship Registers: An
International Update, 22 TUL. MAR. L. J. 198 (1997-98).
150. Duruigbo, supra, note 53, at 117.
151. Lauritzen, supra note 11, at 585.
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section explores these alternate bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction,
specifically with reference to their application in maritime law.
The Restatement (Third) of International Conflicts divides jurisdiction
into three types: jurisdiction to prescribe, to adjudicate, and to enforce.152
Prescription grants a State jurisdiction to apply its laws to people and
situations.153 Adjudicative jurisdiction is the ability to subject people to a
Enforcement allows jurisdiction to punish
State’s courts.154
noncompliance.155
This section of the paper focuses on jurisdiction to prescribe and
jurisdiction of States to regulate FOCs beyond the law of the flag regime.
Enforcement jurisdiction always exists when there is jurisdiction to
prescribe.156 International law recognizes jurisdiction to prescribe in six
circumstances: Section VII.A discusses the three concepts of the
territoriality principle; Section VII.B looks at the tenuous nationality
principle; Section VII.C explains the protective principle; Section VII.D
discusses the limited universal jurisdiction principle; Section VII.E takes
a look at the weak passive personality principle; and Section VII.F
considers flag State permission. Additionally, Section VII.G examines
the trump of State sovereignty, which is independent of international law.
Section VII.H discusses the choice of law questions resulting from
concurrent international jurisdiction. Part VIII then applies these
concepts to the FOC challenge.
Some jurisdictional bases are more tenuous than others; consequently,
jurisdictional claims can be strengthened by having more than one basis
for jurisdiction.157 As Section VII.H further discusses, a State should
decline jurisdiction where it would be unreasonable.158
A.

TERRITORIALITY PRINCIPLE

The least controversial and most common basis of jurisdiction to
prescribe and enforce is the territoriality principle.159 Territoriality

152.
source.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 401. International law cases are referenced through this
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 431.
Id. § 401, Comments a, b.
Id. § 401, Comment a, §403.
Id. § 402, Comment c.
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encompasses three independent concepts: territorial conduct, territorial
presence, and territorial effects.160
Under territorial conduct, a State can prescribe laws regarding “conduct
that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory.”161 The
law of the flag arose naturally from this principle, because a vessel was
considered part of the flag State’s territory. For example, the Supreme
Court relied on the territorial principle and law of the flag in exercising
jurisdiction over a murder committed aboard a United States-flagged
vessel at port in the Belgian Congo.162 The law of the flag survived
shedding the fallacy of vessels as a literal part of a State’s territory, and
today scholars are divided on whether it is an exercise of territorial
jurisdiction or an independent jurisdiction.163 The uniformity of this
principle, though appealing, is also constraining.
Under the territorial presence concept, a State can prescribe laws
regarding “the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its
territory.”164 Therefore, vessels in foreign ports are subject to the port
State’s concurrent jurisdiction. The U.S. Supreme Court annunciated the
rationale for this principle in the Wildenhus’s Case. The Court noted that
a vessel voluntarily enters a foreign port and seeks port State protection
during its stay.165 The Court continued that any other system “would be
obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the
laws to continual infraction, and the government to degradation.”166
Consequently, “when a merchant vessel of one country enters the ports
of another for the purposes of trade, it subjects itself to the law of the
place to which it goes.”167 Decades earlier, in a letter to England, United
States Secretary of State Webster similarly argued, “any unlawful acts
done by [a vessel] while thus lying in [a foreign] port, and for all
contracts entered into while there . . . [she] must, doubtless, be
answerable to the laws of the place.”168 He simultaneously affirmed,
“[flag State] jurisdiction is preserved over the vessels even in parts of the
160. Id. § 402.
161. Id.Cf. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. [Aramco], 499 U.S.
244, 248 (“It is a longstanding principle of American law 'that legislation of Congress, unless a
contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.'" (internal citation omitted). However, Congress has since expanded the scope of legislation).
162. United Sates v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 155-56 (1933).
163. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, §402 Comment h (advocating that vessel regulation at sea is
an independent jurisdictional basis but acknowledging that some view it as part of territorial
jurisdiction).
164. Id. § 402.
165. Wildenhus’s Case, 120 U.S. 1, 11 (1887).
166. Id. (quoting The Exchange, 7 Cranch. 116, 144 (1812)).
167. Wildenhus’s Case, supra note 166.
168. Rodgers, supra note 29, at 264-65.
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sea subject to a foreign dominion.”169 This next section of the paper
returns to the choice of law question that obviously arises.170
Under the territorial effects principle, a State can prescribe laws
regarding “conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have
substantial effect within its territory.”171 Potentially nearly boundless, the
effects principle is generally limited to cases of substantial effect.172 It is
not widely applied in the maritime context. In one of the few U.S.
maritime cases relying on the territorial effects principle, the Third
Circuit upheld drug-related charges against foreigners apprehended on
the high seas aboard a Panamanian ship.173 Although the U.S. Coast
Guard intercepted the ship in international waters, the defendants were
convicted under U.S. statutes of possession with unlawful intent to
import marijuana, conspiracy to import marijuana, and possession with
intent to distribute marijuana.174 Of central importance, the trial court
found that the smugglers were heading for the United States, thus
providing a substantial domestic effect.175 Of note, the Circuit Court
actually expanded the traditional effects principle: it found that
international law permitted extraterritorial jurisdiction if effects are
intended to be domestic,176 even if they are not consummated.177 Such
jurisdiction was reasonable, the court found, because the domestic effect
was foreseeable, other States had an interest in regulating this activity,
and there was no comity concern.178
There are few other United States maritime cases relying on territorial
effects. The Eleventh Circuit recognized the effects principle as a basis
of maritime jurisdiction in dicta, though it relied only on the Restatement
(Second) of Foreign Relations,179 Supreme and Appellate Courts

169. Id. at 264.
170. See infra notes 213-241 and accompanying text. Cf. Symeon Symeonides, Symposium on
Choice of Law and Admiralty: Maritime Conflicts of Law From the Perspective of Modern Choice
of Law Methodology, 7 TUL. MAR. L. J. 223, 224 (1982) (“[T]here is hardly any area of conflicts law
. . . where governments are more immediately interested in the outcome of litigation between the
private parties than in the maritime context.”)
171. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 402.
172. Id. § 402, comment d.
173. United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 165-66 (3d Cir. N.J. 1986).
174. Id. at 166.
175. Id. at 169.
176. Id. at 168 (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 402).
177. Wright-Barker, supra note 174, at 167 (citing Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285
(1911); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18
(1965)).
178. Wright-Barker, supra note 174, at 168.
179. Marino-Garcia, supra note 43, at 1382 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS, supra note 178, § 18).
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decisions in non-maritime cases,180 and appellate decisions in maritime
cases involving conspiracy.181 It has also been applied to a human
smuggling prosecution182 and to documents forged to conceal an oil
discharge.183
B.

NATIONALITY PRINCIPLE

The nationality principle, or jurisdiction of “activities, interests, status, or
relations of its nationals outside as well as within its territory,”184 is an
exceptional jurisdictional basis that may need to be bolstered with an
additional basis.
The U.S. Supreme Court in part relied on the nationality principle when
it upheld a Florida State court’s conviction of an American deep-sea
diver for illegally removing sponges in the Gulf of Mexico.185 The Court
dismissed the defendant’s central contention that Florida impermissibly
applied its laws outside of State jurisdiction: “the United States is not
debarred by any rule of international law from governing the conduct of
its own citizens upon the high seas or even in foreign countries when the
rights of other nations or their nationals are not infringed.”186 The Court
supplemented the defendant’s American nationality with a version of the
territoriality effects principle in holding, “Thus, a criminal statute dealing
with acts that are directly injurious to the government and are capable of
perpetration without regard to particular locality, is to be construed as
applicable to citizens of the United States upon the high seas or in a
foreign country.”187 This case is one of many that shows how U.S. courts
must supplement their decision when applying the nationality principal.

180. Marino-Garcia, supra note 43, at 1382 (citing Strassheim, supra note 178, at 285); United
States v. Baker 609 F.2d, 134, 138 (5th Cir. Fla. 1980); Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882 (5th
Cir. Tex. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 884 (1967)).
181. Marino-Garcia, supra note 43, at 1382 (citing United States v. Gray, 659 F.2d 1296, 1298
(5th Cir. Tex.1981); United States v. DeWeese, 632 F.2d 1267, 1271 (5th Cir. Fla. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981); United States v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124, 1129 (5th Cir. Texas 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1063 (1981)).
182. United States v. Best, 172 F. Supp. 2d 656, 661 (D.V.I. 2001) (holding that the effects
principle grants subject matter jurisdiction but dismissing the human trafficking indictment due to
lack of personal jurisdiction); United States v. Viegers, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16122 *4 (D.V.I.
1994).
183. United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, LTD., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1364 (S.D. Fla.
1998). This was a particularly liberal application of the domestic effects principle: the court found a
domestic effect in undermining the U.S. Coast Guard.
184. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 402 Comment b.
185. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 69-70 (1941).
186. Id. at 73 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
187. Id. at 73-74 (citations omitted).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol19/iss1/12

22

Powell: Flags of Convenience

2013]
C.

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME CREATES

285

PROTECTIVE PRINCIPLE

The protective principle enables a State to prescribe laws with respect to
conduct “directed against the security of the State or against a limited
class of other State interests.”188 Reachable conduct is restricted to the
limited class of offenses “that are generally recognized as crimes by
developed legal systems,” such as espionage, counterfeiting, official
document falsification, perjury, and immigration violations.189
In the maritime context, courts often discuss this principle with respect to
the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, which criminalizes drug
possession on “a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”190
Congress specifically stated in the Act that drug trafficking is universally
condemned and threatens U.S. security.191 In the cases reviewed for this
paper, courts maintained only in dicta that the protective principle could
be a basis of jurisdiction;192 they instead relied on flag country permission
to find jurisdiction.193
D.

UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION PRINCIPLE

Under universal jurisdiction, a State may prescribe laws regarding
“certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal
concern.”194 These offenses, such as piracy, slave trade, genocide, and
war crimes,195196 are determined by customary and positive international
law, and are evidenced by a universal condemnation and desire to
control; there need not be any other link.197 For example, United States

188. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, §402.
189. Id. § 402, Comment f.
190. United States v. Vilches-Navarrete, 523 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. P.R. 2008) (quoting 46 U.S.C. §
70503(a)(1)).
191. United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 553 (1st Cir. P.R. 1999) (quoting 46 U.S.C. app.
§ 1902).
192. See e.g., Vilches-Navarrete, supra note 191, at 21-22 (Lynch, J., concurring); United States
v. Gonzales, 311 F.3d 440, 446 (1st Cir. P.R. 2002) (Torruella, J., concurring); Cardales, supra note
192, at 553.
193. Vilches-Navarrete, supra note 191, at 11; Cardales, supra note 192, at 553.
194. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 404.
195. Id. § 404, Comment a.
196. It is the author’s contention that there is no universally accepted list of what crime
constitutes a universal concern. It has been proposed that the United Nations has a specific list of
crimes that would be of a universal concern, including: piracy, slavery, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, torture, and genocide. However, it can be argued on the contrary that not all parties would
agree to the UN’s “universal” list. For the UN’s universal list, please see,
http://www.amicc.org/docs/Universal%20Jurisdiction%20Q&A.pdf.
197. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20,§ 404.
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Supreme Court Chief Justice Marshall stated that pirates can be
prosecuted by any State.198
Although this principle is well settled as a jurisdictional basis, defining
its contours is contentious. The standard is so high that even terrorist
activities are not prescribed under this jurisdiction.199 Consider the
criteria the United States First Circuit used in declining to hold drug
trafficking as a universal offense: it is neither an “attack on the
international legal order”200 nor “‘so inhumane, so shocking to the
conscience, that it makes all jurisdictional’ considerations irrelevant.”201
This surprising case holding is just one example of the difficulty in
applying this principal.
E.

PASSIVE PERSONALITY PRINCIPLE

Under the passive personality principle, a State may prescribe laws if the
victim is a national of that State.202 It is a tenuous basis for jurisdiction203
and consequently is often coupled with another jurisdictional basis or
additional jurisdictional hooks.
For example, the United States Ninth Circuit sustained a conviction
against a St. Vincent and the Grenadines citizen for sexual contact with
an American minor aboard a Panamanian-flagged cruise ship in Mexican
waters.204 In finding jurisdiction, the court relied heavily on both the
victim’s nationality and the cruise ship’s other United States contacts: it
departed from and returned to a California port.205

198. United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. 144, 152 (1820). While this pronouncement was
arguably dicta, the Court considered it binding in a case later in the same term. United States v.
Holmes, 18 U.S. 412, 416 (1820).
199. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 107 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2003); RESTATEMENT, supra note
20, § 404, Comment a.
200. United States v. Cardales-Luna, 632 F.3d 731, 746 (1st Cir. P.R. 2011) (U. PENN. PRESS,
NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, 17879 (Stephen Macedo ed. 2004)).
201. Cardales-Luna, 632 F.3d 731, 746 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Eugene Kontorovich, Beyond
the Article I Horizon: Congress's Enumerated Powers and Universal Jurisdiction over Drug Crimes,
93 MINN. L. REV. 1191, 1226 (2009)). But cf. United States v. Estupinan, 453 F.3d 1336, 1339
(11th Cir. Fla. 2006) (suggesting that drug trafficking is universally condemned).
202. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 402, Comment g.
203. See Marino-Garcia, supra note 43, at 1382 n.15 (“The [passive] principle, however, has
generally not been accepted in this country as a basis for jurisdiction.” (citations omitted)); United
States v. Neil, 312 F.3d 419, 423 (9th Cir. Cal. 2002) (“[I]n general, the passive personality principle
has not been accepted as a sufficient basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction over ordinary torts and
crimes.” (citations omitted)).
204. Neil, supra note 203, at 420.
205. Id. at 422.
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FLAG STATE PERMISSION

A State may board a foreign ship on the high seas if the flag State grants
permission.206 In some circumstances, the boarding State may even apply
its domestic law.207 This appears to be an outgrowth of the principle that
a State may bind itself by agreement.208
For instance, in the Cardales-Luna case, Venezuela authorized the U.S.
Coast Guard to board and apply United States law to a Venezuelan vessel
150 miles south of Puerto Rico.209 Upon finding marijuana aboard, the
foreign crew was apprehended and charged with violating the Maritime
Drug Law Enforcement Act.210 The defendants contested that the Act did
not provide jurisdiction over them, because they had no nexus with the
United States. The court disagreed that due process or international law
was violated because “the flag nation's consent eliminates any concern
that the application of United States law may be arbitrary or
fundamentally unfair.”211
G.

STATE SOVEREIGNTY

Some jurists and scholars further argue that Congress can reach overseas,
even in the absence of an enumerated basis, so long as it acts in
accordance with the Constitution.212 For example, Justice Scalia in his
dissent recognized this Congressional power in writing, “[t]hough it
clearly has constitutional authority to do so, Congress is generally
presumed not to have exceeded those customary international-law limits
on jurisdiction to prescribe.”213 Some also claim an analog to this
206. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 522. See also United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366, 37576 (5th Cir. Tex. 2002) (holding that as a matter of “generally accepted international law” a flag
State can invite another State’s jurisdiction).
207. See Cardales-Luna, supra note 200, at 553; United States v. Robinson, 843 F.2d 1, 4 (1st
Cir. Mass. 1988) (holding that because international agreement can be the basis of extraterritorial
legal prescription, State authorization to apply foreign law to its vessel is legitimate).
208. See, e.g., The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 135 (1812) (“All exceptions,
therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories, must be traced up to
the consent of the nation itself.”).
209. Cardales-Luna, supra note 200, at 552.
210. Id.
211. Suerte, supra note 206, at 371 (citations omitted).
212. Congress would have to expressly declare this intention to avoid the long-standing canon
of construction which dictates reading statutes as complying with international law. Lauritzen,
supra note 11, at 578 (referencing Marshall, C.J., in The Charming Betsy, 2 U.S. 64, 118 (1804)).
213. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting in
part) (emphasis added) (neither the majority nor the dissent relied on this Congressional authority).
Accord United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir. V.I. 1993) (“There is, of
course, no doubt the Congress may override international law by clearly expressing its intent to do
so.”); United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (“An American
statute may override international law, but only when Congress has expressed the clear intent to
supersede the existing law of nations.” (citations omitted)).
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sovereignty: the Court has asserted that maritime law has no domestic
force unless it is accepted by the United States.214
H.

CHOICE OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

Differences between territorial jurisdiction and the law of the flag
necessarily present a conflict of laws. In evaluating a statute to
determine if a different jurisdictional basis should apply, U.S. courts look
to Congressional intent and principles of international law. Courts first
evaluate if Congress intended for a statute to apply extraterritorially. If
so, courts inquire if Congress intended to contravene the law of nations215
or more narrowly to go to the limits of international law. When
Congressional intent is clear, the analysis is simplified. When
Congressional intent is not easily discernible, the courts look to
principles of international law.
When Congressional intent to exceed international law is clear, courts
often recognize its right to do so. Broadly, the U.S. Supreme Court has
declared, “When it desires to do so, Congress knows how to place the
high seas within the jurisdictional reach of a statute.”216 More
specifically, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act extends U.S. jurisdiction
to “[e]very bill of lading or similar document of title which is evidence
of a contract for the carriage of goods by sea to or from ports of the
United States, in foreign trade.”217 The Fifth Circuit presumptively
applied this Act: “We have no difficulty in finding the threshold
jurisdictional requirement” to a flagless barge218 that sank on an internal
waterway between German ports219 and had a bill of lading opting for
Belgian law.220 The barge was ultimately destined for a “mother ship”
that would transport it to New Orleans.221Although applying the Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act to this situation almost certainly exceeded

214. Lauritzen, supra note 11, at 578 (“ “The law of the sea,” we have had occasion to observe,
is in a peculiar sense an international law, but application of its specific rules depends upon
acceptance by the United States.” quoting Farrell v United States, 336 U.S. 511, 517 (1949)).
215. Hartford Fire, supra note 213, at 813-15 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
216. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 440 (1989). The
Court cited three such examples of extraterritorial intent: 14 U.S.C. § 89(a), which permits Coast
Guard seizure of vessels on the high seas; 18 U.S.C. § 7, which extends criminal jurisdiction over
U.S. vessels to the high seas; and 19 U.S.C. § 1701, which permits the President to establish
customs-enforcement areas on the high seas. Id. at 440, n.7.
217. Wirth, Ltd. V. S/S Acadia Forest, 537 F.2d 1272, 1275 n.6 (5th Cir. La. 1976) (quoting 46
U.S.C.A. § 13000).
218. Id. at 1279. A significant matter for the litigation was whether this particular type of barge
should be considered a ship and required to have a flag.
219. Id. at 1275.
220. Id. at 1275 n.6.
221. Id. at 1278.
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international law,222 the court seemingly found Congress’s intent to do so
clear.
The U.S. Supreme Court has also upheld application of United States law
to foreign ships’ internal matters while in U.S. ports, traditionally an area
for flag State jurisdiction.223 The Seaman’s Act of March 4, 1915,
applies wage payment provisos to “seamen on foreign vessels while in
harbors of the United States.”224 When a British seafarer invoked the Act
against his British ship despite his British contract, the Court found that
Congress’s purpose was “to place American and foreign seamen on an
equality of right in so far as the privileges of this section are
concerned.”225 Therefore, the Court subjected the British ship to the
Seaman’s Act.226
Similarly, courts have heeded Congress’s desire that the Limitation of
Liability Act apply to “the owner of any vessel whether American or
foreign.”227 Although this statute often runs into direct conflict with
foreign law, courts apply it to incidents lacking any American connection
beyond a port of call.228 Courts have additionally extended Congress’s
extraterritorial intent to seamen’s rights229 and drug trafficking with no
U.S. nexus.230
When Congressional intent is unclear, canon of construction compels
that a statute be read as consistent with international law.231 Courts must
also evaluate international law’s boundaries when Congress intends to
reach, but not exceed, the limits of international law. In the maritime
context, that analysis of international law is guided by “the needs of a
general federal maritime law and with due recognition of our selfregarding respect for the relevant interests of foreign nations in the
regulation of maritime commerce as part of the legitimate concern of the
international community.”232

222.
223.
below.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id. at 1282-83.
See infra notes 231-43 and accompanying text: the holistic reasonableness test described
Strathearn S.S. v. Dillon, 252 U.S. 348, 353 (1920).
Id. at 353.
Id. at 355.
Symeonides, supra note 171, at 230-31 (quoting 46 U.S.C. §183(a) (1976)).
Id. at 234.
See infra note 310 and accompanying text discussing the Jones Act.
See supra notes 189-190 discussing Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act.
Hartford Fire, supra note 213, at 815 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 382-83 (1959).
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The Restatement and court opinions are illustrative of what
considerations inform this analysis.
The Restatement conditions
jurisdiction on an all-inclusive reasonability constraint.233 Relevant
criteria include: the locus of the offense and its effects, other connections
such as offender or victim nationality, the relative importance of the
regulation to the State or to the international system, the existence of
individual expectations and international traditions, and the likelihood of
interstate conflict.234
The U.S. Supreme Court in Lauritzen v. Larsen delineated similar factors
when it considered a Danish seaman’s suit against a Danish-flagged
vessel for a tort suffered near Cuba.235 The only connection with the
United States was that the seaman signed his employment contract in
New York.236 By its terms, the Jones Act237 included United States
jurisdiction over maritime torts that occur anywhere, but it was unclear if
Congress actually intended for such broad extraterritorial application in
violation of international law.238 The Court, mindful of “considerations
of comity, reciprocity and long-range interest,”239 considered the place of
the wrongful act, the flag, the victim’s domicile, the offender’s domicile,
the place of contract, the accessibility of a foreign forum, and the law of
the forum.240 Ultimately, the Court concluded that domestic jurisdiction
would be unreasonable.241 The Lauritzen factors, though neither
exhaustive nor mechanical,242 continue to guide maritime choice of
law.243

233. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 403. See also Hartford Fire, supra note 213, at 818
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (relying on § 403 to evaluate the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman
Antitrust Act).
234. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 403.
235. Lauritzen, supra note 11, at 573.
236. Id.
237. “Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his
election, maintain an action for damages at law.” 46 U.S.C. § 688 (revised as 46 U.S.C. § 30104)
quoted in Lauritzen, supra note 11, at 582 (emphasis added).
238. Lauritzen, supra note 11, at 577-78.
239. Id. at 582.
240. Id. at 583-91.
241. Id. at 592-93.
242. Hellenic Lines v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 308-09 (1970).Cf. Romero, supra note 232, at
382-83 (“These [choice of law] principles do not depend upon a mechanical application of a doctrine
like that of lex loci delicticommissi.”).
243. Lauritzen, supra note 11, at 573, 581 (explaining that the choice of law question is guided
by “the usual doctrine and practices of maritime law”). See Hartford Fire, supra note 213, at 820-22
(citing Lauritzen as in accord with RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 403); Romero, supra note 232, at
382 (“The broad principles of choice of law and the applicable criteria of selection set forth in
Lauritzen were intended to guide courts in the application of maritime law generally.” (citing
Lauritzen, supra note 11, at 577)). See also Symeonides, supra note 171, at 238. Some courts
consider an eighth factor. See infra notes 301-305 and accompanying text.
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VIII. EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN ORDER OF THE SEAS
FOC States will remain a significant part of global commerce. Their
potential to disrupt the fragile maritime order is unambiguous, though
experientially, their impact is mixed. The international community’s
response to FOC registrations has probably been a significant factor in
maintaining order. This section reviews what these responses have been
and how else the international community could use international law to
avert FOC vessels’ potential abuses.
Section VIII.A discusses port State’s responses to FOCs. Section VIII.B
explores coastal State responses to FOCs. Section VIII.C studies
international efforts to create minimum registry requirements. Section
VIII.D considers international agreements designed to maintain maritime
order. Section VIII.E discusses the utility of universal jurisdiction in
maintaining maritime order. Section VIII.F examines the litigation
remedy provided by lifting the corporate veil. Section VIII.G reviews
States’ use of the nationality principle to reach blameworthy actors.
Section VIII.H considers States’ programs to encourage domestic
shipping. Finally, Section VIII.I discusses States’ prerogative to
contravene international law.
A.

PORT STATE CONTROL

Port States, acting under the territorial presence principle, inspect foreign
ships visiting their ports. Precedent suggests that jurisdiction is limited
to matters that affect the port, as opposed to those that are purely internal
to the ship. Although this port State control is a highly relevant factor in
maintaining shipping standards – one author calls it “the most effective
cure of the malaise of the maritime industry”244 – it has its limitations.
A vessel’s voluntary entrance into a foreign port subjects it to that port’s
laws under the territorial presence principle.245 However, courts have
eschewed such broad application because of its deleterious effects on
commerce.246 Instead, jurisdiction remains with the flag State unless the
vessel’s master or flag State requests intervention, the port State’s
national interests are implicated, or the offense disturbs the port’s peace

244. John Hare, Port State Control: Strong Medicine to Cure a Sick Industry, 26 GA.J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 571, 571 (1997).
245. See Wildenhus, supra note 166, at 120.
246. Wildenhus, supra note 166, at 12 (“From experience, however, it was found long ago that it
would be beneficial to commerce if the local government would abstain from interfering with the
internal discipline of the ship, and the general regulation of the rights and duties of the officers and
crew towards the vessel or among themselves.”).
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or involves a non-crew member.247 For example, cognizant of foreign
relations and economic impacts,248 and sensitive to the “onerous” and
“speculative burden” of subjecting a ship to different rules because she is
fortuitously in a particular port when a claim arises,249 the U.S. Supreme
Court declined to exercise jurisdiction over a Spanish seafarer injured
aboard a Spanish-flagged vessel in a New Jersey port.250
Arguably, this division has come under stress in the modern exercise of
port State control. Port State control agreements extrapolate from a port
State’s right to control its ports and reach a port State’s right to control
access to its ports.251 Port States then condition access on compliance
with labor, safety, and environmental measures that have an effect
beyond the port itself.252 For example, port States may investigate
whether a ship “threatens damage to the marine environment.”253 They
may even inquire into some internal ship matters, such as crew living
conditions.254 Perhaps in acknowledgment of traditional notions of port
State control, generally only international—rather than domestic—
regulations are applied to visiting foreign vessels.255
The mechanics of port State control are straightforward. A port State
requires ships to announce their anticipated arrival and conducts a
preliminary analysis.256 It selects ships to inspect, based on factors
including the type of ship, its detention record, and its classification
society.257 Most significantly for present purposes, the port State also
considers the detention rates of the vessel’s flag State.258 In addition to a
247. Ademuni Odeke, Port State Control and UK Law, 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 657, 660 (1997).
See also Wildenhus, supra note 166, at 12 (“And so by comity it came to be generally understood
among civilized nations that all matters of discipline and all things done on board which affected
only the vessel or those belonging to her, and did not involve the peace or dignity of the country, or
the tranquility of the port, should be left by the local government to be dealt with by the authorities
of the nation to which the vessel belonged.”).
248. Romero, supra note 232, at 382-83.
249. Id. at 384.
250. Id.
251. DESOMBRE, supra note 81, at 89.
252. Hare, supra note 244, at 583 n.23. (referencing the International Convention on Load
Lines; Safety of Life at Sea (and its protocols); International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships; Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping; Convention on the
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, International Convention on Tonnage
Measurement of Ships, Merchant Shipping Convention 1976 (ILO Convention No. 147).
253. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Art. 219. See also Arts. 216-220 quoted in DESOMBRE, supra
note 81, at 90.
254. DESOMBRE, supra note 81, at 90 (discussing The Merchant Shipping (Minimum
Standards) Convention (1976)).
255. See id.
256. Hare, supra note 244, at 583 n.37 (citing Ports and Waterways Safety Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§
1221-1232 (1986)).
257. DESOMBRE, supra note 81, at 93-94.
258. Id. at 95.
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visual examination of general condition, a preliminary inspection
involves a document examination to ensure compliance with
international agreements, valid registration, and current classification and
insurance.259 A more involved inspection ensues if authorities uncover
disparities.260 The nature of violations dictates the port authority’s
response: it may refer the vessel to the flag State261 or it may detain the
ship until the violation is rectified.262 Memorandums of Understanding
among port States cover most of the world and help maximize the
number of inspected vessels.263 In theory, this system should encourage
flag States to adopt stricter standards to help their registered vessels
avoid costly inspections and potential detentions.264 In fact, a survey of
UK and Isle of Man ships found that ship owners chose those registries,
in part, to reduce the potential for port State inspections.265
Port State control is not a panacea, though. Observers point out that port
States are unlikely to exercise jurisdiction when their interests are not
directly involved, such as an oil discharge hundreds of miles from the
coast, because such involvement is onerous and may reduce future port
visits.266 Observers additionally allege that some port States falsify
reports or free ride by relying on the stricter controls of other port States’
to protect them.267
Country-specific studies offer mixed results. An investigation of
flagging standards suggests that while port State control stemmed a “race
to the bottom,” it is insufficient to prompt every vessel to reach the
highest standards.268 Instead, it results in a “race to the middle,” in which
the majority of registries have modest standards.269 In this race to the
middle, bottom-dwellers raise their standards to reduce inspections but
other countries emerge to replace them.270 The investigation’s author
259. Id. at 92.
260. Id. See also UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Art. 222(1).
261. DESOMBRE, supra note 81, at 90-91. See also UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Art. 222(1).
262. DESOMBRE, supra note 81, at 89-90. See also UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Art. 219,
222(1).
263. DESOMBRE, supra note 81, at 91.
264. Anderson, supra note 57, at 168. The flag State’s incentives are reinforced by the
International Transport Workers’ Foundation, which targets high detention rate countries for labor
actions. DESOMBRE, supra note 81, at 97.
265. Brooks, Mary R. & J. Richard Hodgson, The Fiscal Treatment of Shipping, in SHIPPING
ECONOMICS 160-61 (Elsevier Ltd., 2005) (citing Kevin Cullinane & Mark Robertshaw, The
Influence of Qualitative Factors in Isle of Man Ship Registration Decisions, 23 MAR. POL’Y &
MGMT. (Issue 4) 321-37 (1996)).
266. Duruigbo, supra note 53, at 132.
267. DESOMBRE, supra note 81, at 97.
268. Id. at 53.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 99.
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compared individual flag detention rates to international averages, and
discovered that port State control raised the flagging standards of
Liberia, the Marshall Islands, Vanuatu, and Cyprus.271 However, some
FOC States remained undeterred by baneful reputations and their costs
for ship owners. For example, despite persistently high detention rates,
Honduras made only a small effort to purge the lowest standard ships
from its registry.
B.

COASTAL STATE CONTROL

Seemingly relying on the territorial effects principle, the international
community has bolstered coastal State prescriptive and enforcement
powers for civil and criminal matters. Recall that under territorial
effects, States can exercise jurisdiction over people and activities that
have or are intended to have a substantial effect within their territory.
Since effects are diminished as a vessel moves seaward, a coastal State’s
jurisdiction correspondingly decreases.272
Coastal State civil jurisdiction is at its maximum in territorial waters.
Under UNCLOS, vessels in territorial waters retain a diminished
freedom of navigation called innocent passage, which permits
“continuous and expeditious” passage that is “not prejudicial to the
peace, good order or security of the coastal State.”273 Coastal States may
adopt and enforce regulations relating to inter alia, “safety of navigation
. . . fisheries laws and regulations of the coastal State . . . [and] the
preservation of the environment of the coastal State.”274 These rules can
be more stringent than international rules, though they cannot hamper
innocent passage.275 For example, a coastal State may inspect and even
detain a vessel navigating the territorial seas if it has “clear ground for
believing” the vessel violated international environmental regulations
while in its territorial seas.276 Coastal States also have criminal
jurisdiction of vessels in their territorial waters. UNCLOS limits this
jurisdiction to instances in which the crime’s consequences affect the
coast State, the crime disturbs order of the territorial sea, the crime
involves drug trafficking, or the ship’s master or flag State requests
assistance.277

271. Id. at 98-127.
272. See infra notes 274-280.
273. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Arts. 18-19.
274. Id. at Art. 21.
275. Id. at Art. 24, 211(4); 220(2); Duruigbo, supra note 53, at 122.
276. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Art. 220(3).
277. Id. at Art. 27. See also supra Section VII. Bases of Jurisdiction Other than the Flag of
Convenience.
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In the next zone seaward, the contiguous zone, a coastal State’s
prescriptive jurisdiction is restricted to “prevent[ing] infringement of its
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations.”278
Similarly, in the exclusive economic zone, enforcement jurisdiction is
significantly reduced. A port State can only detain a vessel when it
reaches a higher standard of proof of more direct damage.279 Normally,
the coastal State simply gathers registry and last and next ports of call
information for violations in the exclusive economic zone.280
C.

REGISTRY REQUIREMENTS

In a much-discussed but largely ineffective approach, the international
community attempted to qualify vessel registrations. Specifically, it
mandated a “genuine link” between the registering State and vessel. This
approach epitomizes the tension between traditional maritime principles
and challenges of the new order: the international community has
struggled to define “genuine link” in light of the understanding that State
sovereignty includes the right to set registry terms.
The “genuine link” language arose from the Nottebohm Case, which held
that an individual’s citizenship is based on “a genuine connection of
existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of
reciprocal rights and duties.”281 Three years later, the Convention on the
High Seas asserted, “[t]here must exist a genuine link between the State
and the ship.”282 Seemingly contradictorily, it also affirmed that “[e]ach
State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships.”283 A
quarter-century later, UNCLOS incorporated nearly identical language.284
The Restatement similarly outlines a genuine link requirement, while
acknowledging that States must recognize flags that lack such a link.285
The genuine link requirement has been largely toothless for at least two
reasons. First, as indicated above, the documents themselves seem to
schizophrenically condition a State’s right to register and simultaneously

278. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Art. 33.
279. Id. at Art. 220(6).
280. Id. at Art. 220(3). Under some heightened circumstances, the coastal State can inspect the
vessel. Id. at Art. 220(5).
281. Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6), at 23. See also Anderson, supra
note 57, at 149; Duruigbo, supra note 53, at 118.
282. 1958 Convention, supra note 19, at Art. 5.
283. Id.
284. See UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Art. 91(1) (“Every State shall fix the conditions for the
grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its
flag . . . There must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship.”).
285. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 501 Comment b.
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grant a sweeping right to register.286 Second, “genuine link” is
inadequately defined. Nottebohm discusses “reciprocal rights and
duties,” but in the context of vessel registration – vice human citizenship
– rights and duties seem to arise from, rather than precede, registering.287
This view is reinforced by an explanatory clause following the 1958
Convention’s genuine link requirement: “in particular, the State must
effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative,
technical and social matters over ships flying its flag.”288 Thus, it appears
that a genuine link exists when a State exercises jurisdiction, which it
would only do after a vessel is registered.289
The United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships
(UNCCORS)290 attempted to close this gap by defining genuine link.
Specifically, it required that States either291 prescribe the “level of
[national ownership] participation”292 or mandate that “a satisfactory
part” of the officers and crews are nationals.293 However, it failed to
define what constitutes a sufficient “level of participation” or a
“satisfactory part.”294 Therefore, UNCCORS probably does not add teeth
to the genuine link requirement.295
The international community has also tried to regulate standards. For
example, UNCLOS demands that flag States promulgate pollution laws
that “have the same effect as that of generally accepted international
rules and standards.”296 However, of the jurisdictional bases discussed
earlier, none applies to pollution laws; that is covered only by
international agreements. Thus, there is seemingly no jurisdictional basis
for enforcement of these regulations other than international agreement.
Further, it is unclear what consequences result from ignoring this
requirement.

286. See supra notes 281-285.
287. Anderson, supra note 57, at 149.
288. 1958 Convention, supra note 19, at Art. 5.
289. See Anderson, supra note 57, at 150.
290. United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, May 1 1986-Apr. 30
1987, 26 I.L.M. 1229 (1987) [hereinafter UNCCORS].
291. Id. at Art. 7.
292. Id. at Art. 8.
293. Id. at Art. 9.
294. Anderson, supra note 57, at 151.
295. Id.Cf Duruigbo, supra note 53, at 120 (arguing that UNCCORS may be a minor addition to
the genuine link definition).
296. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Art 211(2). See also id. at Art. 217.
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INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

International agreements are another widely used mechanism to maintain
order on the seas among FOC vessels. Recall that States, which as a
matter of sovereignty can limit their own sovereignty, can grant
jurisdiction to foreign States. International conventions such as
UNCLOS, is one such example.
The International Maritime
Organization, a United Nations body, has passed a number of other
conventions related to, among other topics, safety, pollution, and
liability.297 In addition, States often sign smaller, more targeted
agreements. For example, the United States has negotiated twenty-six
bilateral agreements permitting U.S. enforcement of U.S. maritime drug
laws on foreign vessels.298
While surely useful, international agreements also have shortcomings.
First, they may counterproductively encourage nefarious ship owners to
register in precisely those States that are most detached from the
international community. Second, agreements cannot possibly cover
every eventuality. Third, there is a significant time lag between
identifying a problem, agreeing to convention terms, and achieving
domestic ratification.299
E.

UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION

Universal jurisdiction, or jurisdiction over activities that are condemned
by international law, offers just a toehold for maintaining maritime order,
because few crimes rise to this level of concern. UNCLOS only permits
high seas seizure of a foreign ship in the event of piracy.300 UNCLOS
more liberally grants the right to board a foreign vessel on the high seas
when there is reasonable suspicion that it is engaged in piracy, the slave
trade, or unauthorized broadcasting, that it is without nationality, or that
it is obscuring its nationality as identical to the boarding ship’s.301
297. See List of IMO Conventions, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION,
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx
(last
accessed
March 18, 2013).
298. Cardales-Luna, supra note 200, at 742.
299. Introduction: Adopting a Convention, Entry Into Force, Accession, Amendment,
Enforcement, Tacit Acceptance Procedure, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION,
www.imo.org/About/Conventions/Pages/Home.aspx (last visited March 18, 2013).
Novel
acceptance procedures, such as not requiring States’ affirmative acceptance for technical
amendments, in part alleviate this lag.
300. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Art. 105. But see Cardales-Luna, supra note 200, at 746
(asserting that UNCLOS also considers the slave trade as universally condemned under UNCLOS
Art. 99). UNCLOS Art. 99 instructs flag States to punish the transport of slaves; it does not permit
universal jurisdiction over slave transport ships.
301. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Art. 110.
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LIFT THE CORPORATE VEIL

In addition, courts sometimes resist the mechanical application of the law
of the flag when they believe a ship’s flag poorly reflects its activities.
Instead, they lift the corporate veil to reach the ship’s true owners via
domestic jurisdiction. Courts inconsistently lift the corporate veil which,
if applied universally, would seemingly unravel not just flags of
convenience but also the law of the flag, generally. Therefore, it is
difficult to annunciate a unifying rule.
Generally, United States’ courts use the multi-factor Lauritzen test,
which resembles the Restatement’s reasonability test, to evaluate the
reach of international law.302 Sporadically, they incorporate a “base of
operations” factor Rhoditis added to the inquiry two decades after
Lauritzen.303 In Rhoditis, the eighth factor enabled the Court to ignore
the “façade” of a Greek-flagged ship that was nearly entirely owned by a
Connecticut domiciliary who managed the corporation out of New York
and operated mostly in America.304 Similarly, in Rainbow Line, Inc. v.
M/V Tequila, the Second Circuit found that American ownership
“overshadowed” British registration and nominal British ownership.305
There are British, French, and Canadian opinions to the same effect.306
For example, a frustrated British court analogized corporate smoke-andmirrors to pirates in remarking, “[p]irates carried the flag of every nation,
but they were hanged by every nation notwithstanding.”307 In summary,
although discounting the corporate structure is not a standard practice,
courts do occasionally lift the corporate veil.
G.

NATIONAL CONTROL

In limited circumstances, States have expanded maritime jurisdiction
based on an actor’s nationality. Recall that the tenuous nationality
principle grants States jurisdiction over their citizens, regardless of where
the harm occurs. UNCLOS adopted this principle with respect to
302. See supra notes 233-43 and accompanying text.
303. Symeonides, supra note 171, at 240; Tetley, supra note 41, at 183.
304. Rhoditis, supra note 242, at 307, 310.
305. Rainbow Line, Inc. v. M/V Tequila, 480 F.2d 1024, 1027 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1973). The court
noted, “it is well settled that courts will look through the façade of foreign registration and
incorporation to the American ownership behind it” (citations omitted).
306. Tetley, supra note 41, at 180-83 (citing Chartered Mercantile Bank of India v. Netherlands,
[1883] 10 Q.B.D. 521 (Eng. C.A.) (Eng.); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial
matters], Feb. 12, 1991, 505 Le Droit Maritime Francais 315) (Fr.); Cass., July 4, 1989, 488 Le Droit
Maritime Francais 639 (1984) (Fr.); Courd'Appeld'Aix-en-Provence, March 11, 1988, 484 Le Droit
Maritime Francais 367 (1989) (Fr.);.Kuhr v. The “Friedrich Busse,” [1982] 134 D.L.R. 3d 261
(Can.); Kosmopoulos v. Constitution Insurance, Co., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 2 (Can.)).
307. Tetley, supra note 41, at 181 (quoting Chartered Mercantile, supra note 306, at 535).
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collisions and other navigational incidents: it permits concurrent
jurisdiction of the flag State and the citizenship State of the master and
other personnel.308
H.

DOMESTIC SHIPPING PROTECTIONS

States have enacted numerous measures to address the national security
concerns of a reduced merchant marine. These include incentives for
domestic flagging and emergency control of foreign ships.
A number of government programs incentivize ship owners to flag in the
United States. They are intended to promote a domestic maritime
industry – shipbuilding infrastructure, shipbuilders, and seafarers – for
mobilization in the event of war of national emergency.309 For example,
under the Jones Act, shipments between United States ports are restricted
to vessels that were American-built and are owned and crewed by
Americans.310 To retain domestic shipping, Norway, Denmark, France,
Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Germany, and the U.K. have experimented
with “second registries.”311 The lower taxes of these shadow registries
are intended to attract ship owners.312
The United States has also adopted programs to assure emergency
maritime transportation access. One such initiative, the U.S. Maritime
Security Program, subsidizes sixty United States-flagged vessels that
agree to be available for official transport upon the Secretary of
Defense’s request.313 Also, the U.S. Merchant Marine Act of 1936 grants
the United States “effective control” of ships that are majority United
States-owned but registered in Panama, Liberia, the Bahamas, Honduras,
and the Marshall Islands.314 The flag States apparently tolerate this
sovereignty encroachment as an insurance payment against forceful
United States interference with the FOC regime.315 The size and

308. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at Art. 97.
309. See, e.g., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21566, THE JONES ACT (updated 2003).
310. 46 U.S.C. 30104. Canada has similar requirements for domestic shipping. See Brooks &
Hodgson supra 265, at 151-52.
311. Wiswall, supra note 92, at 111-13.
312. Id.
313. U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration, Maritime Security Program,
http://www.marad.dot.gov/ships_shipping_landing_page/national_security/maritime_security_progr
am/maritime_security_program.htm (last visited March 18, 2013).
314. DESOMBRE, supra note 81, at 214-15.
315. DESOMBRE, supra note 81, at 215.
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effectiveness of this fleet is potentially quite limited,316and this
arrangement remains untested.317
I.

ACT IN CONTRAVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Finally, sovereign States may act in contravention of international law.
Well-established U.S. precedent recognizes that Congress’s
constitutional powers sometimes exceed international law constraints.318
However, this reach is rarely exercised319 and is likely to excite
international opinion.
IX. CONCLUSION
Historical principles remain the cornerstone of the maritime legal regime.
As this paper described, the original principles set the scene for the rise
of FOC States, which often enjoy exclusive civil, criminal, and
regulatory jurisdiction.
This paper explored—theoretically and
empirically—how the divergent motives of FOC States and the
international community may disrupt the tenuous stability of the
maritime commons.
The rapid expansion of global commerce,
migration, and communication ensure that this jurisdictional quandary
will continue to increase in importance. There is a pressing need to reenvision the maritime legal regime. It is this author’s hope that
policymakers become inspired to develop options based on the
alternative jurisdictional bases discussed in this paper.

316. See Henry S. Marcus, et al., “Increasing the Size of the Effective United States Control
INSTITUTE
OF
TECHNOLOGY
(August
2002),
Fleet,”
MASSACHUSETTS
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a408239.pdf.
317. DESOMBRE, supra note 81, at 214-15; Mr. Heindel comments before the Special Oversight
Panel on the Merchant Marine, “Vessel Operations Under Flags of Convenience and Their
Implications on National Security,” 107th Congress, June 13, 2002. See also, Anderson, supra note
57, at 144 (discussing the U.K.’s need to charter international ships during the First Gulf War).
318. See supra notes 212-234 and accompanying text.
319. Id.
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